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Abstract 
The thesis consists of four self-contained papers. 
Paper 1: Social divisions and institutions: Assessing institutional parameter variation 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions 
and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions. It argues that social divisions 
should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness, which in turn should 
depress institutional payoffs. Absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived 
inclusiveness of institutions, social divisions should then weaken the observed association 
between property rights institutions and income. The empirical results support this hypothesis, 
and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the 
institutional framework applying to the population at large. 
Paper 2: Preferences for redistribution: A country comparison of fairness judgments 
This paper seeks to explain within- and across-country variation in redistributive preferences 
in terms of self-interest concerns and an input-based concept of fairness, which we examine 
by looking at the effects of beliefs regarding the causes of income differences. Results of 
estimations based on data for 25 countries indicate that both factors are indeed important 
determinants of redistribution support, in line with hypothesised patterns. We find that while 
differences in beliefs on what causes income differences seem to be important for explaining 
within-country variation in redistributive preferences, they do little to explain across-country 
differences. Differences in the effects of holding certain beliefs, however, are important for 
explaining across-country variation in redistributive preferences, suggesting considerable 
heterogeneity across societies in what is considered as fair. 
Paper 3: Political participation in Africa: The role of individual resources 
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the resource perspective in explaining African 
political participation. Empirical findings drawing on new data for more than 27 000 
respondents in 20 emerging African democracies suggest surprisingly weak explanatory 
power of the resource perspective. In some cases, the relatively resource poor actually 
participate to a greater extent than the more resource rich. The results are encouraging in that 
they suggest fairly broad-based political participation, but also call attention to the need to 
evaluate the motivational forces behind the decision to take part. 
Paper 4: Institution building with limited resources: Establishing a supreme audit 
institution in Rwanda 
Through a case study of the establishment of a supreme audit institution (SAI) in Rwanda, we 
examine the tensions between institutional first-best benchmarks and local operational 
constraints in a developing country institution-building process. More specifically, our aim is 
to investigate the potential tradeoffs between the programmatic ideal of SAI independence 
and operational constraints in terms of staff capacity in the development of a supreme audit 
oversight function in Rwanda. Drawing on data from document studies and key informant 
interviews, the empirical results suggest that capacity constraints – within the institution as 
well as among its major stakeholders – negatively affect important aspects of SAI functional 
independence, but also that there are arguments for compromising the programmatic ideal of 
SAI independence in order to effectively tackle operational constraints in terms of staff 
capacity. 
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